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Abstract
Economic models of regional economies with local public goods, corrective inter-regional
transfers and population mobility assume decision-makers are small price takers. We argue
this is reasonable for private goods but that local public good prices are in fact endoge-
nous, varying with settlement patterns and hence regional/central policies. Decision-makers
should therefore be modelled as having the power to distort policies in order to manipulate
public good prices. We show that incentive equivalence in regional economies is sufficient
to ensure that known efficiency results, whether the transfer is assigned to regions or the
centre, are undisturbed by endogenous local public good prices. However, the corrective
inter-regional transfer now includes input price externalities arising from migration which
are not accounted for in price taking models. Hence, allowing for endogenous local public
good prices extends what we know about the theory of corrective inter-regional transfers.




A long standing and important literature on inter-regional transfers commenced with the seminal
papers of James Buchanan (1950; 1952) and Buchanan and Goetz (1972). They showed us
that if there are externalities arising from migration, Tiebout-type decentralized equilibria are
inefficient. Flatters et al. (1974) and Boadway and Flatters (1982) subsequently argued that
the distorting effects of migration externalities can be corrected with a centrally directed inter-
regional transfer. Boadway and Flatters (1982) derived an expression for the optimal transfer
which has become well-known and subsequently extended in the fiscal federalism literature (see
Boadway (2004) for an overview). This result is frequently cited as providing an efficiency
case for inter-regional transfers in decentralised economies, particularly federations (e.g fiscal
equalisation grants).
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One idea to follow on from these earlier papers, due to Myers (1990) and Mansoorian
and Myers (1993), is that if regions can make voluntary transfers among themselves, incentive
equivalence induced by migration, even if imperfect, ensures that a socially optimal outcome is
a decentralised Nash equilibrium to a policy game played between regions. This result obviates
the need for central corrective transfers on efficiency grounds since regions themselves choose the
optimal transfer. Of course, there may still be an equity role for the centre if the distributional
consequences of decentralised equilibria do not coincide with regional weightings in the centre’s
social welfare function. Though Wellisch (1994) showed the result may not hold if there are
externalities and Mansoorian and Myers (1997) argued it is not robust with respect to the
specification of objectives this remains an enduring notion in fiscal federalism.
Many papers also consider efficiency with imperfect mobility where the transfer is assigned
to the centre. For example, Caplan et al. (2000) develop a three stage game with imperfect
mobility where regions are Stackleberg leaders who pre-commit to voluntary contributions to
a pure national public good. The centre chooses an inter-regional transfer after observing re-
gional policies. Another example, Boadway et al. (2003), assigns the transfer to the centre
and considers a three stage policy game with various orders of moves (see also Bordignon and
Tabellini (2001), Koethenbuerger (2008) and Boadway and Tremblay (2010) for further results
of this nature). Informational issues related to inter-regional corrective transfers have also been
examined in, for example, Cornes and Silva (2000; 2002; 2003). Transfers between regions have
been considered within the context of tax competition; for example, see Koethenbuerger (2002),
Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) and Hindriks et al. (2008), while Albouy (2012) analyses inter-
regional transfers in a federation with differences in amenities, public/private productivities,
federal taxes, and residential land.
The workhorse model underlying the literature, whether the transfer is locally or centrally
assigned, assumes that local public good marginal costs are fixed. With the added assumption
that regions adopt marginal cost pricing this implies local public good prices are also given.
These simplifying assumptions are adopted, presumably, for tractability and to allow focus on
other problems of interest. In effect, decision-makers are modelled as small price takers.
This is difficult to justify for a number of reasons. While private goods are traded and have
a given world supply price local public goods are non-traded. Therefore, there is no particular
rationale for central or regional governments to anticipate that public good costs or prices are
exogenous. This is especially so when one considers the standard model recognises that regional
wage rates are endogenous and we know that labour is an important input into the production
of public goods which are often labour intensive (e.g. health, education and welfare services).
If we acknowledge wage endogeneity then it seems logical to recognise the impact of wages on
local public good marginal costs and hence prices. The standard model also commonly supposes
there is a small number of strategic regions and this is inconsistent with price taking behaviour.
If decision-makers are strategic over the effects of their policies on each other’s output through
migration, then why not with respect to the effects of policies on local public good costs and
prices?
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The objective in this paper is to examine the implications for efficiency and the corrective
transfer of allowing local public good prices to be endogenous. We do this by developing a
strategic model with the same general structure as found in the literature. The important
difference is that the total cost of providing a local public good is explained by a minimum
cost function based on regional production technologies. The cost of local public goods, and by
implication prices, are dependent on regional and central policies, and are no longer fixed.
We then show that migration now creates input cost externalities which are overlooked
in fixed price models. Social optimality requires these externalities to be internalised within
the first order necessary condition for an efficient spatial distribution of the population. It is
demonstrated that, whether the transfer instrument is assigned to regions or a central authority,
decision makers always choose transfers that satisfy this new spatial efficiency condition. In
essence, there is sufficient incentive equivalence, even with imperfect mobility, to ensure that
the impact of price setting behaviour on settlement patterns is corrected by the transfer. This
means that known efficiency results for these models are not disturbed by recognising that
decision makers have the power to change local public good prices through their policy choices.
However, as we also show, the standard expression for the optimal inter-regional transfer must
be modified to incorporate these input cost externalities.
It needs to be noted that decision-makers in our model determine prices indirectly through
the variables they control: public goods and inter-regional transfers. Prices are not choice
variables, as they are in models of, say, Bertrand-type price competition.
The paper structure is as follows. Section 2 sets up the model with endogenous prices while
Section 3 derives the conditions for optimality. Sections 4 and 5 study the impact of price
setting on efficiency under regional and central assignment of the transfer respectively. Section
6 shows how the efficient transfer is modified by cost and price setting and why this establishes
an efficiency case for cost equalisation. Conclusions are presented in section 7.
2 Model
Imagine a federation with two regions indexed by i = 1, 2. The federation has a given population,
N, of mobile citizens each endowed with a unit of labour which they supply to their region of
residence. Hence, from now on N is also the national labour supply. If we set this equal to one
for ease of exposition the national labour supply constraint becomes n1 + n2 = 1 where n1 and
n2 are the labour supplies to regions 1 and 2 respectively. As will be explained, labour is mobile
within the federation and is a variable input from the perspective of each region. There are also
k = 1, ...,K non-labour inputs in region i where input k is denoted as xik. The sub-vector of
these inputs is
xi = (xi1, ...., xiK) i = 1, 2; k = 1, ...,K. (2.1)
Each region produces a numeraire using a production function, fi(ni,xi), which is continu-
ous, strictly increasing and strictly quasi-concave on R+n where fi(0, 0) = 0. Assuming the price
of the numeraire is one, fi(ni,xi) is also the value of output. With competitive labour markets
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i = 1, 2. (2.2)
Defining the sub-vector of prices for non-labour inputs in region i as wi = (ωi1, ...., ωiK), the




i = 1, 2; k = 1, ...K. (2.3)
To focus on population mobility we further assume non-labour inputs are fixed and hence-
forth define output in region i simply as fi(ni). The wage is also a function of ni as is the price
of each fixed input. For later use, economic rent in region i is
Ri = fi(ni)− wini −wixi i = 1, 2. (2.4)
The numeraire is used to produce a private good, Xi, and a local public good, Gi. The
private good is traded and has a given world supply price, pXi = 1, so Xini is total spending on
Xi. One of two strategies is adopted in the literature to explain the relationship between local
public good output, its benefit and the cost of provision.
Option 1 : The simplest approach is to assume output and benefit are the same. Defining the
benefit as gi this means gi = Gi where Gi is a choice variable. It is also assumed the price of the
public good, pGi , is equal to its marginal cost and that both are fixed. This means the total cost
of the public good, ci, is linear in Gi; that is, ci = pGiGi. In choosing Gi, decision-makers also
choose total cost when prices (marginal costs) are fixed. The marginal rate of transformation
of public for private output in a region, MRTGiXi = pGi/pXi , is also constant. The production
possibilities frontier is linear and with pGi = pXi = 1 it has a slope of -1.
Option 2: The other approach is to suppose the local public good is congested and the rela-




i = 1, 2 (2.5)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is a congestion parameter. When α = 0, Gi is a pure local public good so that
gi = Gi and we have the first option as a special case. If α = 1, Gi is a private good while for
values of α between zero and one Gi is impure. Noting from (2.5) that Gi = n
α
i gi, the cost of
the local public good is ci = pGin
α
i gi where marginal cost and hence pGi are still fixed while gi
becomes the choice variable. Changes in ci now occur because of changes in gi or any policies
which influence ni. Since pGi remains fixed, policies cannot affect ci through pGi . Once again,
MRTGiXi = pGi/pXi is constant as prices remain given and the cost of public goods is not fully
endogenous.
With either approach, the assumption of fixed marginal costs and prices simplifies the way
local public good costs are modelled. The impact of migration and policies on public good cost
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is only partially captured through the output term. It seems more natural to draw on duality
and recognise instead that the total cost of a local public good is explained by a minimum cost
function. To show this, we make the reasonable assumption that output of the local public good
in region i is continuous and strictly increasing on fi(ni). This allows us to define Gi = hi(fi(ni))
which implies the existence of a local public good minimum cost function,
ci(wi,wi, Gi;xi) ≡
min {wini + wixi > 0|hi(fi(ni)) > Gi} i = 1, 2; k = 1, ....,K.
(2.6)
Given the features of the production technology we can be sure the cost function possesses the
standard properties, namely, ci is: (i) zero when Gi = 0; (ii) continuous; (iii) increasing in Gi;
(iv) increasing in wi and ωi; (v) homogeneous of degree one in wi and ωi; and (vi) concave in
wi and ωi. Thus, local public good minimum cost is a function of the wage rate, the sub-vector
of fixed input prices and output of the public good, conditional on xi. This formulation allows
for decreasing, constant or increasing returns to scale in Gi.
The cost of a local public good is now fully endogenous in the sense that it is affected
by both price and output changes resulting from different policy settings and migration. The
endogeneity of prices can be appreciated by noting that from the cost function the marginal cost
of the public good in region i is now mcGi(wi,wi, Gi;xi) = ∂ci/∂Gi. Retaining the assumption,
as we do here, that regions set public good prices equal to marginal cost, then we have
pGi(·) = mcGi(wi,wi, Gi;xi) (2.7)
where we denote the price as pGi(·) to remind the reader that it too is a function of wi, wi and
Gi, conditional on xi. Region i now has a non-linear production possibilities frontier over public
and private output with a slope dependent on input prices and public good output1.
It remains to explain citizens’ income and preferences. A region’s residents receive their
wage income and on the assumption that they own an equal per capita share of the region’s
fixed factors, an equal per person share of the region’s economic rent. This means the income of
a representative resident in region i is simply the region’s average product, fi(ni)/ni. Citizens
in region i consume two goods, a private good, Xi, and a local public good benefit, gi, which
is linked to output through the relationship gi = Gi/n
α
i as in option 2. Preferences are ho-
mogeneous and for a representative resident of region i they are characterised by a continuous,
strictly quasi-concave utility function, ui(Xi, gi). Labour mobility with attachment to place, as
in Mansoorian and Myers (1993), implies
u1(X1, g1) + a(1− n1) = u2(X2, g2) + an1, (2.8)
must be satisfied in a migration equilibrium where a > 0 is the standard attachment parameter.
1Naturally, in the special case of constant returns in Gi marginal cost and price are independent of Gi.
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3 Optimality
On the basis of this model set up suppose a social planner directly chooses ni, xi and gi to
maximise social welfare. The planner makes these choices while accounting for the migration
constraint. For ease of exposition, and without loss of generality, we suppose henceforth that
K = 1 so the non-labour input sub-vector, xi, contains but one element, xi, which we think of as
land, whose price is ωi
2. The public good cost function and price are now defined, respectively,
as ci(wi, ωi, Gi : xi) and pGi(·) = mcGi(wi, ωi, Gi : xi). This set up of the optimal problem
is standard (see Wellisch (1994), Caplan et al. (2000)) with the difference that our planner
accounts for the full public good cost impact of its choices via the cost functions and does not
treat public good prices as given. Using n2 = 1− n1, the social planner solves
Maximise
x1,x2,g1,g2,n1
δu1(x1, g1) + (1− δ)u2(x2, g2)
Sto : (i) u1(x1, g1) + a(1− n1) = u2(x2, g2) + an1
(ii) f1(n1) + f2(1− n1)− n1x1 − (1− n1)x2−
c1(w1, ω1, G1;x1)− c2(w2, ω2, G2;x2)
(iii) G1 = n
α
1 g1; (iv) G2 = (1− n1)αg2.
(3.1)
The parameter 0 6 δ 6 1 is the weight given by the planner to region 1 in its objective
function, which we take to represent social welfare for the economy, while (1−δ) is the weight for
region 2. Constraint (i) is the migration equilibrium condition, (ii) is the aggregate feasibility
constraint while (iii) and (iv) define the relationship between public good benefit and output
for each region. From the Lagrange function the first order necessary conditions are
(x1) : (δ + λ1)u1,x1 − λ2n1 = 0
(g1) : (δ + λ1)u1,g1 − λ2pG1(·)nα1 = 0
(x2) : (1− δ − λ1)u2,x2 − λ2n2 = 0
(g2) : (1− δ − λ1)u2,g2 − λ2pG2(·)nα2 = 0
(n1) : −2aλ1 + λ2
([












where u1,x1 , u1,g1 , u2,x2 and u2,g2 are partial derivatives of the utility function for regions 1 and
2 with respect to private goods and local public good benefits.
These conditions differ from the standard ones (see 5(a) to (5(e) in Wellisch (1994)). For
example, the first order necessary conditions for g1 and g2 include endogenous rather fixed public
good prices. More importantly from our perspective, the first order necessary condition for n1
now incorporates the derivatives, dc1/dn1 and dc2/dn2, which capture regional changes in the
least cost of producing local public goods as labour supplies change. As we will now show, these
are local public good cost externalities which arise from changes in a region’s labour supply
when we allow for endogenous prices and hence the full public good cost effects of migration.
2This could be any fixed factor, for example, a natural resource.
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i = 1, 2. (3.3)
From property (iv) of the public good cost function ∂ci/∂wi > 0 and ∂ci/∂ωi > 0. Diminishing
returns to labour implies ∂wi/∂ni < 0. It is also reasonable to suppose that ∂ωi/∂ni > 0,
namely, inward migration to region i increases the marginal product (price) of the fixed factor.
The expression at (3.3) makes it clear that the public good cost externality consists of three







This has a negative sign. A larger ni reduces wi which in turn lowers ci since labour is an input
into the production of local public goods. This lower public good cost is a benefit enjoyed by
all residents of region i. That is why we think of it as a positive cost externality arising from
inward migration to region i. Through the wage effect a higher population reduces the cost of
producing a given amount of the local public good. It is true that a lower wage also reduces per
capita income for existing residents but this effect of inward migration is captured elsewhere
in the mathematics of the model and is internalised by migrants in their location cost/benefit
calculus. Here we are only interested in the impact of lower wages on the cost of providing
public goods. This link is not considered in models with fixed local public good prices. Hence,
such models do not capture the wage cost externality.







This has a positive sign. An increase in ni raises the price of land, ωi, and this in turn increases
the least cost of providing a given amount of local public good since land is an input to its
production. The land cost externality is a cost borne by the residents of region i. This is why
we think of it as a negative externality arising from inward migration to region i. Note that
higher land prices also increase income of existing residents. However, as with the wage change
induced by migration, this too is captured elsewhere by the mathematics of the model and
internalised by migrants in their private cost/benefit calculus. Here the focus is on capturing
the effect of higher land prices on the cost of local public goods in recognition that land is an
input to their production. The fixed factor (land) cost externality is not captured in models
with fixed local public good prices.
Finally, changes in ni affect cost through Gi and this is captured by the last term on the
right hand side of (3.3), namely, (∂ci/∂Gi)(∂Gi/∂ni). Noting from (2.7) that ∂ci/∂Gi = pGi(·)
and using Gi = n
α
i gi to obtain ∂Gi/∂ni = αn
α−1
i gi this final term becomes
Congestion cost externality: α
pGi(·)Gi
ni
> 0 i = 1, 2. (3.6)
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This is the additional cost which must be met in region i to hold the benefit, gi, constant, when
labour supply goes up, thus creating congestion. This cost is borne by all residents of region i
and is, therefore, thought of as a negative congestion cost externality. Only when α = 0 and the
public good is pure does this externality disappear from (3.3). Of the three externalities that
determine the local public good cost externality, the congestion effect is the only component
captured by models with fixed local public good prices. As noted earlier, fixed price models do
capture the impact of migration on public good costs via output. The congestion cost externality
operates through the output term.
Hence, the total cost externality precipitated by migration when public good costs are fully
endogenous is the sum of wage, fixed factor (land) and congestion cost externalities. While the
congestion and land cost externalities have the same sign, increasing the cost of providing a
unit of the public good for all residents, the wage cost externality has opposite sign. In general,
the sign of the cost externality is ambiguous.
Models with a fixed public good price capture only the congestion cost externality and do
not account for the wage and land cost externalities (see for example, equation 3 on page 207 of
Boadway et al. (2003)). The wage and fixed factor cost externalities work through local public
good prices - hence their absence in fixed price models - while the congestion effect works via the
output changes needed to retain a given benefit. In fixed price models, the cost externality is,
therefore, equal to the congestion cost externality, and is always negative. As we shall see later
when we examine the optimal transfer with endogenous prices, the congestion cost externality
gets wrapped up with the positive fiscal externality created by inward migration; indeed, it
detracts from the fiscal externality depending on the magnitude of α. This also occurs in our
model but we are always left with the wage and land cost externalities as separate influences
on migration choices which must be internalised by the corrective transfer.
Solving for λ1 and λ2 from the first order conditions for x1 and x2 in (3.2) and using these
solutions in the first order condition for n1, while permitting δ to vary from 0 to 1, the first



















This is analogous to the spatial efficiency conditions (16) and (17) in Mansoorian and Myers
(1993) and equations (7) and (26) in Wellisch (1994) and Caplan et al. (2000) respectively with
one key difference. In our model, the social marginal benefit, SMBi, of adding a migrant to
region i is SMBi = wi − xi − dci/dni. When public good costs are fully endogenous optimality
requires the total cost externality for each region to be internalised within the social marginal
benefit terms in the first order necessary condition for an efficient population distribution.
Combining the first order conditions for x1, g1, x2 and g2 from (3.2) yields the familiar






= pGi(·) = MRTGi,xi i = 1, 2. (3.8)
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Expressions (3.7) and (3.8) are the first order necessary conditions for spatial efficiency
and local public good provision respectively. Both must be satisfied in a federation with fully
endogenous local public good costs and prices in order to achieve optimal outcomes.
The main point from the analysis in this Section is that when local public good costs and
prices are fully endogenous migration creates cost externalities made up of wage, fixed factor
price and congestion externalities. Models with fixed prices capture the last of these externalities
but not the first two which operate via the public good price. A social planner looking for an
optimum on the utility possibilities frontier for this economy internalises the additional wage
and fixed factor cost externalities within the spatial efficiency condition. When public good
costs and prices are endogenous one of the conditions for optimality in a federation is modified.
4 Decentralised equilibria
To examine decentralised equilibria when public good costs are endogenous we suppose the
local public good benefit, gi, is assigned to region i as a choice variable. Region i has a second
choice variable, a non-negative lump-sum transfer, Zij > 0, which it can make to region j, where
i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2; and i 6= j. Therefore, the set of choice variables for region i is sri = {gi, Zij}
while the set of choice variables for the economy is sr = sri × srj . Total numeraire in region i,
the sum of produced output and its net transfer, is defined as fi(ni)− Zij + Zji. We continue
to consider the case where there is one fixed input (land).
The cost function for the public good is now arrived at by supposing Gi is continuous and
strictly increasing on the total numeraire, fi(ni)−Zij+Zji. This implies the existence of a public
good cost function, ci(wi, ωi, Gi;xi) ≡ min {wini + ωixi > 0|hi(fi(ni)− Zij + Zji) > Gi}. The
feasible condition for region i is
niXi + ci(wi, ωi, Gi;xi) = fi(ni)− Zij + Zji; i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2; i 6= j. (4.1)








+ a(1− n1) =
u2
{






This implies that n1 is, implicitly, a function of the economy’s choice variables and we define
n1(s
r). (4.3)
From (2.2) and (2.3), wi and ωi are functions of ni, while from (2.5) Gi is a function of ni
and gi. Together with (4.3) this implies that the least cost of providing local public goods is
a function of the policy vector, sr. Total spending on local public goods is now a function of
regional policies; local public good provision and the transfers. It also implies that local public
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good prices defined at (2.7) are functions of regional policies. Regions are, therefore, large cost
and price setters even though they do not choose prices as choice variables.
This raises the potential for regions to distort policies to influence public good costs and
prices. Such potential exists in fixed price models but as noted earlier only through the output
effects of migration, not the wage and fixed factor (land) cost externalities which work through
prices. The question examined below is whether this extra cost inter-dependence induced by
price endogeneity is sufficient to draw regions into inefficient behaviour.
We suppose regions choose gi, Zij and Zji with Nash conjectures in order to maximise per
capita welfare within their political borders, subject to feasibility and the migration equilibrium
condition. They correctly anticipate labour location choices and changes in local public good
costs arising from their policy choices. Hence, regions anticipate the impact of their choices on
settlement patterns, as in the standard approach, but also recognise these choices endow them
with the ability to change the total cost of public goods in their own and neighbouring regions.










subject to: (4.2), Z12 > 0 and G1 = nα1 g1. With Nash conjectures, the region considers Z21 and
g2 to be given. Differentiating the objective function in (4.4) with respect to Z12 and g1 yields
the first order necessary conditions for Z12 and g1 respectively
(Z12) :
(






− 1 6 0; Z12 > 0;
∂u1
∂Z12
Z12 = 0 (4.5)
(g1) :
(











− pGi(·)nα1 = 0. (4.6)











































Combining (4.5) and (4.7) yields the first order necessary condition for Z12,(
















Z12 = 0; Z12 > 0, (4.10)
while (4.6) and (4.8) yield the efficiency rule (3.8) implying region 1 chooses an efficient local
public good benefit and output.
10
Region 2 solves an analogous problem. Its first order necessary condition for Z21 is(
















Z21 = 0; Z21 > 0. (4.11)
The region also chooses g2 to satisfy the efficiency rule, (3.8).
Combining (4.10) and (4.11) implies the following condition for the spatial distribution of



















This is equivalent to (3.8), the social planner spatial efficiency condition when local public good
costs and prices are fully endogenous.
Thus, in a Nash equilibrium where public good prices and costs are endogenous regions pro-
vide local public goods efficiently and transfers ensure the population distribution is consistent
with the spatial efficiency condition. A socially efficient equilibrium in a decentralised economy
with cost and price setting regions is a Nash equilibrium to the policy game.
The important point here is that regions do not distort provision of local public goods or
their transfers when public good costs and prices are fully endogenous. Price setting behaviour
is not a source of inefficiency. Rather, regions use voluntary transfers to internalise the new wage
and land cost externalities which arise when costs and prices are endogenous. There is sufficient
incentive equivalence between regions, even when migration is imperfect, to ensure they use
their transfers to offset the impact of price and cost setting behaviour on location choices, thus
ensuring efficiency in terms of the distribution of labour and public good provision. Thus, Myers
(1990) and Mansoorian and Myers (1993) decentralised efficiency results also hold when regions
are large cost and price setters.
5 Centrally directed inter-regional transfers
The result above implies that with endogenous public good costs and prices there is no efficiency
case for centrally directed inter-regional transfers, except on equity grounds. For example, the
centre may not like the equity effects of a particular decentralised equilibrium. Nevertheless,
we are interested in what happens to efficiency with price setting behaviour when the transfer
is centrally assigned. This is because in practice inter-regional transfers (e.g. fiscal equalisation
grants) are undertaken by central agencies. As noted in the Introduction, there has also been
a focus in the fiscal federalism literature on models with centrally directed transfers.
To examine this case, suppose a central authority chooses a single lump sum transfer, ρ,
from region 1 to 2. If ρ > 0, the transfer favours region 2 and if ρ < 0 it favours region 1.
Regions continue to choose gi. The set of regional choice variables is g = (g1, g2) while the
set of choice variables for the economy under central assignment of the transfer is sc = (g, ρ).
Now the policy set is shared between regions and the centre. Furthermore, we assume Gi is
strictly increasing on fi(ni) ± ρ so the local public good cost function is ci(wi, ωi, Gi;xi) ≡
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min {wini + ωixi > 0|hi(fi(ni)± ρ) > Gi}. The migration equilibrium condition becomes:
u1
{




+ a(1− n1) =
u2
{






The migration condition implies that n1 is, implicitly, a function of the economy’s policy set,
sc. This implies that the minimum cost and price of providing a given level of public goods are
functions of the policy set. Regions retain the ability to manipulate their public good provision
to influence prices though they no longer make transfers. The central authority now has the
transfer instrument and the ability to manipulate prices. The question is, will regions and the
central authority choose policies efficiently?
Suppose regions and the central authority are Nash competitors moving simultaneously
while correctly anticipating migration responses and recognising that their policies affect local
















subject to (5.1), G1 = n
α
1 g1 and G2 = n
α
2 g2. Once again, the parameter 0 6 δ 6 1 is the weight
placed by the authority on the welfare of region 1 and (1− δ) is the weight on welfare for region
2. As in the planner problem, we suppose the central authority’s objective is the social welfare
function for the federation. Unlike the planner, the central authority cannot choose n1 directly,
though as we shall see, it does choose n1 indirectly via the transfer, ρ, for given regional policies.
From (5.2) we obtain the first order necessary condition for ρ. As for the decentralised game
(5.1) yields an expression for the migration response to the transfer, ∂n1/∂ρ, which is equivalent
to (4.7). Combining yields the first order necessary condition for ρ as(



















This is equivalent to (3.7) and (4.12). Hence, the central authority chooses a transfer which
ensures an efficient distribution of the mobile population. The additional wage and land cost
externalities arising when public good prices are endogenous are internalised by the authority
within the social marginal benefit terms, as is required for optimality.










subject to (5.1) and G1 = n
α
1 g1 while taking g2 and ρ as given. From the region’s objective
we can obtain the first order necessary condition for g1 and from the migration condition an
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expression for the migration response, ∂n1/∂g1, identical to (4.8). Combining yields the first







Since this is the efficiency condition, (3.8), region 1 provides g1 efficiently in a Nash equilibrium
with centrally directed transfers. As for regional assignment of the transfer, the region does
not distort public good provision in order to manipulate local public good costs and prices.
Region 2 solves an analogous optimisation problem while taking g1 and ρ as given. Its first
order necessary condition for g2 is analogous to (5.5) implying efficient provision of g2.
The point here is that with central assignment of the transfer wage and land cost externalities
arising from migration with fully endogenous costs and prices are still internalised in the transfer
chosen by the authority. In addition, regions choose efficient levels of local public goods even
though they have no transfer instrument yet can affect prices. A socially efficient equilibrium
with a price setting centre and regions is a Nash equilibrium to a policy game in which the
centre chooses the inter-regional transfer and regions choose local public good benefits.
This can be pushed further by allowing the same assignment of choice variables but different
timing of decisions. For example, we have solved a three stage game with the timing of moves in
Caplan et al. (2000). In this set up, regions are Stackleberg leaders choosing local public good
benefits in stage 1. The central authority chooses the transfer in stage 2 and labour makes its
location choice in the final stage. We are able to show that even with this timing price setting
behaviour of itself is not distorting since the central transfer authority still internalises the wage
and land cost externalities arising from cost setting behaviour within the corrective transfer,
conditional on regional policies chosen in stage 1. It is true that equilibria with this timing of
move are no longer optimal, but this is because regions distort local public good provision in
stage 1 as they engage in strategic behaviour over the transfer they anticipate to be chosen in
stage 2. We do not present this game as it does not add to insights in relation to efficiency and
cost setting behaviour. That problem and its solution are available on request.
6 The optimal transfer with input cost externalities
As noted earlier, the literature on transfers frequently derives a well-known expression for the
optimal inter-regional transfer on the assumption local public good prices are fixed so costs are
not fully endogenous. This expression comes from the first order necessary condition for the
transfer from the decentralised policy game, or games where the transfer is centrally directed.
We have shown above that, whether the transfer is centrally or regional assigned, the first order
necessary condition for the transfer is modified by decision-makers to include the wage and fixed
input price externalities which arise when public good costs are fully endogenous.
It is natural to expect the standard expression for the optimal transfer to also be modified by
price setting behaviour. To see how, we use the first order necessary condition for the transfer
undertaken by the central authority, (5.3). By virtue of our findings the result is comparable if
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we use (4.12) from the decentralised set up. Specifically, we combine the definition of economic
rent, (2.4), the expression for the change in least cost arising from migration, (3.3), and the
definition of Xi from the budget constraint for region i with the first order necessary condition









































where ρ∗ is the value of ρ which solves (5.3) for δ = 1.
The impact of fully endogenous local public good costs and prices can be appreciated by
comparing this optimal transfer with the transfer when local public good prices are fixed (see,
for example, equation (12) in Boadway and Flatters (1982), (4.1) in Myers (1990) or variations
in the papers discussed in the Introduction). Note first that both incorporate inter-regional
differences in congestion adjusted fiscal externalities, (1− α)(pG1(·)G1/n1 − pG2(·)G2/n2), and
per capita economic rents, R1/n1−R2/n2. As noted, the (negative) congestion cost externality
identified in the discussion of Section 3, is added to the (positive) fiscal externalities arising from
migration to create the congested adjusted fiscal externalities. When α = 1, the congestion
cost externality is exactly offset by the fiscal externality and the congestion adjusted fiscal
externalities disappear. Apart from this point, these determinants of the optimal transfer are
not further explained here since they are well-known.
What is new in our expression is that the optimal transfer, ρ∗, is also a function of inter-
regional differences in the wage and fixed input (land) cost externalities arising from migration
when public good costs and prices are endogenous. This follows directly from the fact that
these externalities, discussed in detail after equation (3.3) in Section 3, are internalised within
the first order necessary condition for the transfer, whether regionally or centrally assigned. If
we expand the fixed input sub-vector then the optimal transfer must take account of as many
such input cost externalities as there are fixed inputs.
The point to note here is that the traditional model with fixed public good prices overlooks
the input cost externalities, focussing instead on the role of efficient inter-regional transfers in
correcting for fiscal externalities and differences in per capita economic rents across regions. By
allowing public good prices to be endogenous, our analysis highlights that an efficient transfer
must also correct for the effects of migration on variable and fixed input costs to the extent
they impact on the cost of providing local public goods. In other words, the efficient transfer
should correct for fiscal, rent and input cost externalities.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued local public good costs and prices in regional economies with
migration are dependent upon settlement patterns and the policies which determine those pat-
terns. This means decision makers are (large) cost and price setters rather than the price takers
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of the traditional model. In an economy with endogenous local public good prices decision
makers can potentially distort their policies to manipulate public good costs and prices.
Using two policy games, one with transfers assigned to regions and the other with a central
transfer, we show that despite the potential for price setting to be distorting there is sufficient
incentive equivalence, even with imperfect mobility, for decision-makers to always choose trans-
fers which internalise the new input cost externalities arising from migration in the presence
of endogenous prices. With regional or central transfers known efficiency results, regardless of
transfer assignment, are not disturbed by allowing for cost and price setting behaviour. We
show, however, that the expression for an optimal inter-regional transfer is significantly modi-
fied by allowing for endogenous costs and prices. Specifically, it must now take account of the
input cost externalities associated with migration.
Overall, therefore, the assumption of fixed local public goods prices in regional models with
local public goods, migration and corrective transfers is a reasonable abstraction in the sense
that known efficiency results also hold in a world with endogenous prices. However, it does
mean current theory omits some insight into the nature of efficient transfers and their role in
correcting for input price externalities arising from migration.
References
Albouy, D., 2012. Evaluating the efficiency and equity of federal fiscal equalization. Journal of
Public Economics 96 (9-10), 824–839.
Boadway, R., 2004. The theory and practice of equalization. CESifo Economic Studies 50 (1),
211–254.
Boadway, R., Cuff, K., Marchand, M., 2003. Equalization and decentralization of refvenue
raising in a federation. Journal of Public Economics 5 (2), 201–228.
Boadway, R., Flatters, F., 1982. Efficiency and equalization payments in a federal system of
governance: a synthesis and extension of recent results. Canadian Journal of Economics 44,
82–104.
Boadway, R., Tremblay, J., 2010. Mobility and fiscal imbalance. National Tax Journal 63 (4,
Part 2), 1023–1054.
Bordignon, M.P, M. P., Tabellini, G., 2001. optimal regional redistribution under asymmetric
information. American Economic Review 91, 709–723.
Buchanan, J., 1950. Federalism and fiscal equity. American Economic Review 40, 583–599.
Buchanan, J., 1952. Central grants and resource allocation. Journal of Political Economy 60,
208–217.
Buchanan, J., Goetz, C., 1972. Efficiency limits of fiscal mobility: An assessment of the tiebout
model. Journal of Public Economics 1, 25–43.
15
Bucovetsky, S., Smart, M., 2006. Efficiency consequences of local revenue equalization: Tax
competition and tax distortions. Journal of Public Economic Theory 8, 119–144.
Caplan, A., Cornes, R., Silva, E., 2000. Pure public goods and income redistribution in a
federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect mobility. Journal of Public Economics
77, 265–284.
Cornes, R., Silva, E., 2000. Local public goods, risk sharing, and private information in federal
systems. Journal of Urban Economics 47, 39–60.
Cornes, R., Silva, E., 2002. Local public goods, inter-regional transfers and private information.
European Economic Review 46, 329–356.
Cornes, R., Silva, E., 2003. Public good mix in a federation with incomplete information. Journal
of Public Economic Theory 5, 381–397.
Expert Panel on Equalization and Territorial Formula Financing, 2006. Achieving a National
Purpose: Putting Equalization Back on Track. Department of Finance, Canada, May.
Flatters, F., Henderson, V., Mieszkowski, P., 1974. Public goods, efficiency, and regional fiscal
equalization. Journal of Public Economics 3, 99–112.
Hindriks, J., Peralta, S., Weber, S., 2008. Competing in taxes and investment under fiscal
equalisation. Journal of Public Economics 92, 2392–2402.
Koethenbuerger, M., 2002. Tax competition and fiscal equalization. International Tax and Pub-
lic Finance 9, 391–408.
Koethenbuerger, M., 2008. Federal tax-transfer policy and intergovernmental pre-commitment.
Regional Science and Urban Economics 38, 16–31.
Mansoorian, A., Myers, G., 1993. Attachment to home and efficient purchases of population in
a fiscal externality economy. Journal of Public Economics 52, 117–132.
Mansoorian, A., Myers, G., 1997. On the consequences of government objectives for economies
with mobile populations. Journal of Public Economics 63, 265–281.
Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M., Green, J., 1995. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press,
New York.
Myers, G., 1990. Optimality, free mobility, and the regional authority in a federation. Journal
of Public Economics 43, 107–121.
Wellisch, D., 1994. Interregional spillovers in the presence of perfect and imperfect household
mobility. Journal of Public Economics 55, 167–184.
16
